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Abstract: The semantic map that Haspelmath (1997) offered for indefinite pronouns is 
highly valuable, but it is problematic and too simple about the relation between the 
meaning of the indefinite pronoun itself, its context, and the resulting meaning-in-
context. As a representation of the meaning-in-context, it is claimed that one should go 
back to the Square of Oppositions, more particularly, to a three-layered ‘Neo-
Aristotelian’ representation of this square. 
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1. Haspelmath’s indefiniteness map 
Semantic maps have become an important tool in linguistic typology and one of the best 
known semantic maps is the one that Haspelmath (1997) proposed for indefinites. The 
map is represented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Haspelmath’s indefiniteness map 
 
Each of the nine map points represents different “functions” (or “uses”) (Haspelmath 
1997: 61). In (1) to (9) each of these functions is illustrated with English examples. 
 
(1) Somebody called you while you were away: guess who? 
(2) I heard somebody, but I couldn’t tell you who. 
(3) Please ask somebody else. 
(4a) Has somebody told you about it? 
(4b) Has anybody told you about it? 
(5) John doesn’t think that anybody will be there. 
(6a) I haven’t seen anybody. 
(6b) I have seen nobody. 
                                                 
1 This work was made possible through the Belgian Federal Science Ministry Grant P6/44 (within the 
program of interuniversity attraction poles) and grant G.0152.09N (Research Foundation - Flanders). The 
paper continues the line of thought sketched in van der Auwera & Van Alsenoy (forthcoming). Thanks 
are due to the organizers of the 19th ISTAL: it was wonderful bringing “Neo-Aristotle” to the Aristotelian 
University. 
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(7a) If you see somebody, tell me immediately. 
(7b) If you see anybody, tell me immediately 
(8) He is better than anybody else in the group.  
(9) Anybody can solve this problem. 
 
In a semantic map the functions are more or less close to another. Thus one can readily 
assume that direct negation is close to indirect negation, however they are defined, and 
that is why the map represents them next to one another and furthermore connects them 
with a line. This semantic contiguity (or perhaps better ‘functional contiguity’) is 
reflected by form: the indefiniteness markers that have more than one function 
normally2 have functions that are contiguous. We can see this in Figure 2, which is 
Haspelmath’s representation of the polyfunctionality of English somebody, anybody and 
nobody (Haspelmath 1997: 249). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: English somebody, anybody and nobody 
 
 
In different languages the counterparts of the English indefinite pronouns may have 
different functions, but—this at least is the hypothesis—languages ‘project’ their 
indefinite pronouns on the same map and the functions of the markers are normally 
contiguous. Consider Figure 3, the Haspelmath (1997: 266) map for Greek personal 
indefinites. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Greek kápjos, kanénas/kanís, opjosdhípote 
 
 
                                                 
2 For exceptions see van der Auwera, Kehayov and Vittrant (2009). 
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 Haspelmath’s Indefinite pronouns (1997) proved ground breaking in at least two 
ways. First, it constituted the first typological and theoretically well informed 
investigation of indefinite pronouns. As to the typology, it is based on a fairly detailed 
analysis of 40 languages, and it includes partial analyses of another 100 languages. For 
an area that had posed many difficult semantic puzzles, even for individual languages, 
the attempt to discuss these puzzles relative to a sizable typological sample had 
landmark value. It must also be noted that the decision to go typological did not dilute 
the semantic finesse. Haspelmath (1997) successfully integrated insights from earlier 
work, while also improving on many previous hypotheses and combining them in a 
coherent overall framework. Second, Haspelmath (1997) also proved ground breaking 
in a methodological way. It was the first monograph size study making crucial use of 
the semantic map methodology. In retrospect this proved highly influential. The 
methodology has become a cornerstone of typological work, and is undergoing 
continuous developments (cf. a 2008 theme issue of the journal Theoretical Linguistics 
and a 2010 theme issue of the e-journal Linguistic Discovery). For both of these reasons 
the book has become a classic within typology. 
 Surprisingly, for the more language-particular study of indefinites the impact of 
Haspelmath’s book has been more modest. In the case of the detailed investigation of 
just one language, this is at least partially understandable, for the wide scope of 
typology will almost inevitably lose out on language-specific detail. But some of the 
recent language-particular work does involve more than one language, not the 140 
languages of Haspelmath (1997), but two or three or even a few more. One could call 
this ‘contrastive work’. One can make the point about the lack of impact of 
Haspelmath’s typological work on current contrastive work with a remark on Vlachou 
(2007). Vlachou (2007) is a study of the free choice markers of English, French, and 
Greek. In this important work, there is only one reference to Haspelmath. Vlachou 
considers her work ‘theoretical’ and she makes clear that theory will profit from 
contrastive work (Vlachou 2007: 80) by quoting Haspelmath (1997: 7): 
 
Linguistic typology is indispensable for our goal of explaining particular 
grammatical phenomena and of detecting significant generalizations.  
 
This quote comes from Haspelmath’s introduction, a small section on the nature of 
typology. Of the more than 300 pages of the Haspelmath book which directly concern 
the cross-linguistic study of indefinites Vlachou (2007) has made no use.3 
 The semantic map methodology has not made any impact on contrastive studies 
either. This point can again be illustrated with Vlachou (2007: 169). She remarks that 
free choice elements in English, French, and Greek are semantically similar, though not 
identical, a situation suggesting Wittgensteinian ‘family resemblances’. But the 
suggestion is left there and does not lead to the obvious step, for a typologist at least, of 
embracing semantic maps as the methodology par excellence to represent family 
resemblance. 
 The lack of impact of typology on language-specific work is due, at least in part, to 
what one could call an ‘intersubdisciplinary’ gap. Some of the language-specific work 
on indefinites is highly formal, whether syntactic or semantic, and Haspelmath’s work 
                                                 
3 It is tempting to see whether Haspelmath (1997) made any impact on the other major book size 
contrastive and Greek-inclusive study of negative polarity, i.e. Giannakidou (1998). The impact is in fact 
minimal too, but here time probably proved an obstacle: Haspelmath (1997) (and its earlier PhD version) 
came too late to influence Giannakidou (1998) (and its earlier PhD version): this much is conversationally 
implicated by a footnote in Giannakidou (1998: 4). 
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is functional.4 Functionalism is functionalism and formalism formalism and not always 
do the twain meet. It is also possible, though, that some of Haspelmath’s (1997) work is 
flawed or at least lacking in important respects. We will show that this is the case.  
 
 
2. Meanings, contexts and meanings-in-context 
Current thinking on negative polarity and free choice items stresses the importance of 
distinguishing between the meaning of the item by itself, the effect of the context, and 
the resulting meaning-in-context (Giannakidou 1998, Vlachou 2007, Hoeksema 2010). 
Haspelmath (1997) is aware of this, and he chooses to focus on meanings in contexts, 
but only on those that are cross-linguistically relevant (Haspelmath 1997: 59-61). These 
meanings-in-context are in fact the functions that occur on the map. “Conditional”, for 
instance, does not of course refer to indefiniteness as such, nor to a conditional context 
only, but to the indefinite meaning as we find it in a conditional context. This is both 
interesting and problematic. 
 The good thing about the intermediate position is that it allows Haspelmath (1997: 
59) to steer clear of monosemy vs. polysemy discussions. Let us clarify this with 
somebody and anybody. The map in Figure 2 shows that they both lend their services to 
various functions. But what exactly is it then that they lend? And to what exactly? Is it 
one and the same meaning and are only the contexts different? Or can the meanings be 
different as well? Haspelmath (1997: 59) reserves the right to remain uncommitted. All 
that matters is that the distinction phrased in terms of different ‘functions’ has cross-
linguistic relevance, i.e., that different languages express these ‘functions’ with different 
markers.  
 Note that the description of a function may involve more than one type of context. 
Consider his “free choice” function. If we take English and we restrict ourselves to 
somebody, anybody and nobody, the map in Figure 2 tells us that the free choice 
function is exclusively realized by anybody. (9), repeated below, already illustrates this 
function. 
 
(9) Anybody can solve this problem. 
 
(9) exemplifies a context with an explicit possibility word, viz. the modal can. There are 
other contexts. (10) is a generic sentence, and (11) is a conditional apodosis 
(Haspelmath 1997: 51).5 
 
(10) Anybody will tell you that smoking is bad for you. 
(11)  If you gave him a chance, he would insult anybody. 
 
Just like there are three contexts, there are also three meanings-in-context. But there is 
still only one function, for the distinction between the three contexts is claimed not to be 
relevant cross-linguistically. If a language uses a marker for one context and thus one 
meaning-in-context, it will also use it for the other two.  
 Interestingly, when it comes to explaining why the map looks the way it does, 
Haspelmath sometimes drops the uncommittedness about the meanings of the markers 
themselves. To see this, we first need to be reminded of the fact that Figure 2 credits 
                                                 
4 Language-specific work of the functionalist strand does take recourse to Haspelmath (1997): see Fobbe 
(2004) on German and van der Auwera, De Cuypere & Neuckermans (2006) on Dutch. 
5 We had a so-called ‘conditional’ function before, viz. function (7) on the map, but this only concerns 
conditional protases. Here we are dealing with conditional apodoses. 
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anybody with functions other than the free choice function. There are in fact five other 
functions. We repeat the relevant examples and the labels of the ‘functions’. 
 
(4b) Has anybody told you about it?    [question] 
(5) John doesn’t think that anybody will be there.  [indirect negation] 
(6a) I haven’t seen anybody.     [direct negation] 
(7b) If you see anybody, tell me immediately.   [condition] 
(8) He is better than anybody else in the group.   [comparison] 
 
He groups together these functions under the label “negative polarity” and the free 
choice function is explicitly not included. What distinguishes the five negative polarity 
functions from the one free choice function would not in fact be the meaning of 
anybody: anybody is not polysemous or homonymous. Technically, in Haspelmath’s 
view (1997: 117, 129) any always “expresses the low endpoint on a scale” (Haspelmath 
1997: 117). What differs is that the five negative polarity functions involve scale-
reversing contexts, and that the free choice function does not. The details and the jargon 
need not concern us here. The account is rather plausible and all that matters here is to 
remark that it is a little suspicious that the search for meanings of the markers 
themselves does become important when it comes to the explanation of the map.  
In the explanatory part of the work, classifying contexts is also important, and this is 
problematic. Despite the fact that Haspelmath (1997) considers there to be just one any, 
he does make a distinction between two types of contexts and meanings-in-context, viz. 
the negative polarity ones shown in (4) to (8) and the free choice ones shown in (9) to 
(11). This is in the tradition of Ladusaw (1980). However, there are many linguists that 
treat the free choice contexts as negative polarity contexts (e.g. Giannakidou 1998, 
Vlachou 2007). That still does not mean that one cannot subclassify the free choice 
contexts as a special subset of the negative polarity contexts. But where does one draw 
the line? The intuitive notion of free choice is clear enough in the context of the 
possibility modal, as is shown by the paraphrase in (12). 
 
(9) Anybody can do this. 
(12) Anybody that you might want to choose can do this. 
 
But the same paraphrase is available for the negative polarity function called 
“comparison”, which is not classified as free choice. 
 
(8) He is better than anybody else in the group. 
(13) He is better than anybody else in the group that you might want to choose. 
 
The matter is more confusing still when one considers the paraphrase options in terms 
of existential versus universal quantification. On the one hand, the undisputed free 
choice example of (9) allows a reasonable good paraphrase with everybody, but not with 
somebody. 
 
(9)  Anybody can do this. 
(14) ≈ Everybody can do this. 
(15) ≠ Somebody can do this. 
 
On the other hand, the undisputed negative polarity example of direct negation allows 
an existential paraphrase and not a universal one. 
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(6a) I haven’t seen anybody. 
(16) ≈ It is not true that I have seen somebody. 
(17) ≠ It is not true that I have seen everybody. 
 
If this were a criterion, which Haspelmath’s discussion of sentence (22)—see further 
down—would seem to imply, then we have an additional reason for classifying the 
comparison function under free choice. At least some comparative anybody uses indeed 
amount to (very nearly) the same meaning-in-context as comparative everybody.6 
 
(8) He is better than anybody else in the group. 
(18) ≈ He is better than everybody else in the group. 
 
Yet what does one then do with the free choice categorization of the hypothetical 
apodosis, illustrated in (11)? Here somebody seems to make for a good paraphrase, and 
everybody definitely doesn’t. 
 
(11) If you gave him a chance, he would insult anybody. 
(19) ≈ If you gave him a chance, he would insult somebody. 
(20) ≠ If you gave him a chance, he would insult everybody. 
 
With respect to these issues Haspelmath (1997) inherits the problems that have beset 
earlier researchers, and there is no evidence that Haspelmath’s (1997) approach offers a 
better account. 
 Let us now come to a problem that is specific to Haspelmath’s theory. Independently 
of whether one would classify a certain meaning-in-context as one of negative polarity 
or of free choice, one would want each of the map points to identify just one of the 
relevant meanings-in-context and not two. But this is not the case. 
 In his discussion of the conditional function, Haspelmath (1997: 117) takes the 
availability of an existential reading as indicative of negative polarity and the 
availability of a universal reading as indicative of free choice. Consider the conditional 
example of (7b) again. 
 
(7b) If you see anybody, tell me immediately. 
 
(7b) does not accept the paraphrase with everybody. The paraphrase with somebody is 
fairly good, i.e., as good as the paraphrase relations appealed to before. 
 
(21) ≠ If you see everybody, tell me immediately. 
(7a) ≈ If you see somebody, tell me immediately. 
 
However, there are conditionals that do accept a paraphrase with everybody, and these 
are probably always ambiguous. Consider (22) and its two readings, (23a) with 
everybody and (23b) with somebody. 
 
(22) If you can see anybody¸ tell me immediately. 
 
                                                 
6 There are different types of comparatives, and Haspelmath (1997: 79-80) is aware of this (and he 
appropriately refers to Hoeksema 1983). 
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(23a) ≈ If you can see everybody¸ tell me immediately. 
(23b) ≈ If you can see somebody¸ tell me immediately. 
 
Haspelmath (1997: 117) discusses the ambiguous conditional type of (22), too, but 
blames the existence of the two readings on the closeness of negative polarity (“scalar 
endpoint on a reversed scale”) and free choice (“scalar endpoint on a non-reversed 
scale”), but that does not itself explain why the ambiguity does not show up in all 
conditionals. Presumably the availability of the free choice everybody reading is related 
to the presence of the possibility modal can. ‘Computing’ the meaning-in-context in a 
context that has both a negative polarity trigger and a free choice trigger is probably not 
an easy matter. In any case, conditionality as such cannot be said to be uniquely 
associated with a resultant negative polarity function, and neither can possibility as such 
be associated with free choice, yet it is these options that the semantic map represents. 
 A second illustration of the same basic problem concerns direct and indirect 
negation, which are claimed to be negative polarity functions. However, just like for the 
condition function just discussed, one can find contexts allowing paraphrases with 
everybody and these would thus seem to involve the free choice function instead. 
Consider (24) and (25), uses brought to the foreground by Horn (2000).  
 
(24a) I don’t go to bed with just anybody. I have to be attracted to them sexually. 
(24b) ≈ I don’t go to bed with just everybody. I have to be attracted to them sexually. 
 
(25a) I don’t think that I go to bed with just anybody. I have to be attracted to them 
sexually. 
(25b) ≈ I don’t think that I go to bed with just everybody. I have to be attracted to them 
sexually. 
 
The lesson is similar to the one about condition illustrated with (22) and its two readings 
(23a) and (23b): negation does not seem to be as strictly associated with negative 
polarity as the map would suggest. 
 Third, any is claimed to be unacceptable with the so-called “irrealis non-specific” 
function. The latter is supposed to be realized in various contexts, one of them being 
imperatives (Haspelmath 1997: 40-43). However, when discussing the free choice 
function, Haspelmath (1997: 49-50) readily admits that the compatibility of the free 
choice function and the imperative context, as in (26). 
 
(26) A: Bring me a chair. 
  B. Which one? 
  A: Bring me any chair. 
 
The reason why Haspelmath (1997: 59) thinks that free choice is allowed in the second 
imperative in (26) is that “although the sentence is structurally an imperative sentence, 
its communicative force is not that of a command” and that it “is functionally equivalent 
to ‘You can bring me any chair’”. We fail to be convinced by this argument. The 
imperative as such, it seems to us, is always vague between at least a command and a 
permission reading and thus allows both must and can paraphrases. Thus once more, 
free choice would seem to stretch further than just the right-hand bottom corner of the 
map. 
 To conclude, the study of indefiniteness poses complicated problems about the 
relation between the meanings of the indefinite markers themselves, the types of 
8 Johan van der Auwera and Lauren Van Alsenoy 
contexts that they combine with, and the resulting meanings-in-context. These problems 
are not sufficiently accounted for in Haspelmath’s approach. The most important 
problem is perhaps that Haspelmath’s functions relate to one element of context, such as 
conditionality, negation or imperative, and that combining an indefinite marker with 
these does not always lead to a unique meaning-in-context. One could claim that 
Haspelmath’s map is too simple. Yet from another point of view, it could also be said to 
be too complex, when we see that free choice does not merely occur in the one map 
point at the bottom right but spreads to the left.  
 
 
3. A Neo-Aristotelian map 
In the previous section we commented on individual map points. In this section we 
discuss the overall geometry of the map. In van der Auwera & Van Alsenoy 
(forthcoming) we started this and we made the following claims: 
 
i. even though Haspelmath’s indefiniteness map is often taken to be a model of a 
typological semantic map, it is in fact highly unusual in that it maps both positive and 
negative concepts. This is normally not the case. Haspelmath’s (2003: 219) dative map, 
for instance, contains only positive concepts, such as recipient, beneficiary and 
possessor, and there is no space for the interaction with negation. 
 
ii. there is a resemblance between the Haspelmath map and some modern versions of 
the Aristotelian “Square of Oppositions” as applied to quantifiers. More particularly, 
these modern versions do not start from four basic notions, like the classical square, but 
from only three, i.e., all, some and no (see e.g. Horn 1990). Both some and no are also 
mapped on the Haspelmath map; all is not—at least not on the basic map—but it is at 
least close to free choice any. Figure 4 shows a ‘projection’ from a Neo-Aristotelian 
‘Triangle of Oppositions’ to a version of the Haspelmath map for English, one which 
embodies a claim as to where positive any equals positive all. 
 
  no 
some   
   all 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: A Neo-Aristotelian Triangle of Oppositions  
and Haspelmath’s indefiniteness map 
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 Of course, a similarity is not the same as an identity. Basically, the simple triangle is 
much less complex than the Haspelmath map, in part because there is no space for 
negative polarity and the two geometries are designed to show different things. The 
Neo-Aristotelian quantifier triangle concerns quantification, i.e., the difference between 
the universal quantification involving all members of a set, the zero quantification of no 
members of a set, and the existential quantification of some members. One could say 
that the indefiniteness map basically concerns choice: no choice versus specific choice 
and non-specific choice. But the two dimensions are related. A universal and a zero 
quantification both concern a situation of no choice, and the existential quantification 
involves a choice, which could be either specific or non-specific. A combination of 
quantification and choice could give us the following map.  
 
Zero quantification - No choice 
 
Existential quantification 
Specific choice 
Existential quantification 
Non-specific choice 
 
Universal quantification - No choice 
 
Figure 5: A Neo-Aristotelian three-layered square for quantification and choice 
 
 Like the Neo-Aristotelian square for modals and quantifiers argued for in van der 
Auwera (1996, 1998) and van der Auwera & Bultinck (2001), the square has three 
layers, going from zero to existential to universal quantification, but it adds the 
dimension of choice. Like in the Haspelmath map, the three extremes, i.e., existential 
specific, zero and universal are not directly connected. Like both the earlier Neo-
Aristotelian maps and the Haspelmath map the map in Figure 5 is supposed to show 
meanings-in-context. But the map itself does not tell us anything yet about the context. 
It does not tell us, for instance, what the effect of a conditional context is. But remember 
from the previous section that there is no direct link between a conditional context and a 
function and the direct mapping of the Haspelmath map is too simple. It follows that the 
Neo-Aristotelian map does not give any information about the cross-linguistic relevance 
of this or the other context. Both the comparative any of (8) and the possibility modal 
any of (9) resort under ‘Universal quantification - No choice’, but the fact that 
languages often differ from English by having different indefinite markers is not shown 
on the Neo-Aristotelian map. 
 Another difference is that non-specific choice does not have as wide an extension on 
the Neo-Aristotelian map as it has on the Haspelmath map. Thus it does not extend into 
the realm of negation. At the level of meaning-in-context, when a set has no members, 
there is in fact no choice. When the speaker has not seen anybody or when he has seen 
nobody (as in (6)), one does not have to choose among these ‘anybodies’ or ‘nobodies’.  
 
(6a) I haven’t seen anybody. 
(6b) I have seen nobody. 
 
But it is also true that at the level of the meaning part of the meaning-in-context, the 
positive element anybody, has non-specific reference, and it is therefore no accident that 
it is the non-specific anybody that shows up rather than specific somebody. The map 
shows this affinity with the contiguity between non-specific choice and no choice. 
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 The third big difference is between the Neo-Aristotelian and the Haspelmath map is 
that the Neo-Aristotelian map does not show ‘free choice’. At the level of meaning-in-
context for (9), when each member of a set has a capacity, one does not choose, i.e., one 
does not separate those members that have a capacity from those that don’t have it: they 
all have it.  
 
(9) Anybody can solve this problem. 
 
Of course, it is true that at the level of the meaning part of the meaning-in-context, one 
could say that one can freely choose and one can also choose in a non-specific way. 
Again, it is no accident that specific somebody is not allowed and one finds non-specific 
anybody.  
 Let us now deal with some of the map points in more detail. Which of the illustrated 
Haspelmathian functions go where? Under ‘zero quantification - no choice’ we 
obviously categorize the simple negative assertions (5) and (6). 
 
(27) Zero quantification - No choice 
(5) John doesn’t think that anybody will be there. 
(6a) I haven’t seen anybody. 
(6b) I have seen nobody. 
 
Note that both direct and indirect negation go there. We are convinced that Haspelmath 
(1997) is right in considering this distinction cross-linguistically relevant. It even shows 
in English. It has been remarked (by Szabolsci 2004: 415 if not earlier) that some can be 
felicitous for negation too, at least for the kind of ‘raised’ negation illustrated in (5). 
 
(28) John doesn’t think that somebody will be there. 
 
As the map point stands for a meaning-in-context, it stands to reason therefore to 
specify both the meaning and the context. So for English, one would have to note that 
with at least one kind of indirect negation both some and any are possible.  
 Note that the case of direct negation is interesting too. On the Haspelmath map for 
English we find both nobody and not … anybody. This is correct, but the two strategies 
differ with respect to context. For not … anybody the context is indeed one with direct 
negation, as expressed by not, but for nobody the context actually has to be positive. So 
the meaning-in-context ‘zero quantification - no choice’ is realized by three of the 
English -body pronouns, viz. somebody, anybody and nobody, and in at least three types 
of contexts, viz. that of an indirectly negated assertion (“iNEG”), a directly negated 
assertion, and a positive assertion: Figure 6 represents this. Figure 6 repeats the thee-
layered square shown in Figure 5 and deemed appropriate for the level of meaning-in-
context, and it adds a layer specifying the composition of the ‘zero quantification - no 
choice’ meaning-in-context. 
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Zero quantification - No choice 
 
 
 
 
Existential quantification 
Specific choice 
Existential quantification 
Non-specific choice 
 
Universal quantification - No choice 
 
Figure 6: An extended Neo-Aristotelian three-layered square 
 
Note that the account of the meanings and the contexts that yield ‘zero quantification - 
no choice’ is by no means complete. For one thing, the account of the context will have 
to say that interrogative contexts are different. Thus in questions nobody and not … 
anybody do not score the same meaning-in-context. 
 
(29a) Didn’t you see anybody? 
(29b) Did you see nobody? 
 
Also, there is no claim, even when restricted to assertions, that any combination of the 
meanings of somebody, anybody or anybody and the direct or indirect negative contexts 
uniquely determines the ‘no quantification - no choice meaning-in-context. In (24a), for 
instance, anybody occurs in a direct negation context but the resulting meaning is not 
one of ‘zero quantification - no choice’. We will come back to the intended meaning-in-
context later. 
 
(24a) I don’t go to bed with just anybody. I have to be attracted to them sexually. 
 
 Under ‘Universal quantification - No choice’ would resort any positive uses in which 
any is replaceable by every.  
 
(30) Universal quantification - No choice 
  (8) He is better than anybody else in the group. 
  (9) Anybody can solve this problem. 
  (22) If you can see anybody, tell me immediately. 
 
The claim is not that the pronouns any and every are synonymous. That would be a 
claim at the level of the individual item. The claim is only that in some contexts 
anybody and everybody do yield the same contextual meaning (the meaning-in-context). 
Such information can again be entered on the map (with e.g. “COMP” for comparative 
and “POSS” for possibility). 
 
iNEG anybody 
iNEG somebody 
POS nobodyNEG anybody 
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Zero quantification - No choice 
 
 
 
 
Existential quantification 
Specific choice 
Existential quantification 
Non-specific choice 
 
 
 
 
Universal quantification - No choice 
 
Figure 7: A 2nd extended Neo-Aristotelian three-layered square 
 
 On ‘Existential quantification’ we will remain brief. The specific choice subtype is 
Haspelmath’s function (1), and any remaining function goes under non-specific. 
 
(31) Existential quantification - Specific choice 
 (1) Somebody called you while you were away: guess who? 
   
(32) Existential quantification - Non-specific choice 
 (2) I heard somebody, but I couldn’t tell you who. 
 (3) Please ask somebody else. 
 (4a) Has somebody told you about it yet? 
 (4b) Has anybody told you about it yet? 
 (7a) If you see somebody, tell me immediately. 
 (7b) If you see anybody, tell me immediately. 
 (11) If you give him half a change, he would insult anybody. 
 (26) A:  Bring me a chair. 
  B: Which chair? 
  A: Bring me any chair. 
 
Specifications of the compositionality of these functions can be entered on the map 
much like illustrated in Figure 6 and 7. 
 There is one use, not discussed by Haspelmath (1997), that we have not assigned any 
place yet, viz. the one in which not anybody is replaceable by not everybody. 
 
(24a) I don’t go to bed with just anybody. I have to be attracted to them sexually. 
 
(25a)  I don’t think that I go to bed with just anybody. I have to be attracted to them   
 sexually. 
 
iNEG anybody 
iNEG somebody 
POS nobodyNEG anybody 
POSS anybody COMP anybody
POSS everybody COMP everybody
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 The meaning-in-context is actually the troublesome fourth corner of the Aristotelian 
square that triangularists wanted to get rid of.  In the case of quantifiers, for instance, 
one claim is that whereas languages have the one-word quantifiers all, some and no, 
they don’t have anything like nall (Horn 1990). This claim seems true, but nevertheless 
the collocation not all is perfectly well formed and meaningful and not quite the same in 
meaning as some. Furthermore, in the sphere of modals specific constructions do 
specialize for this meaning. English, for instance, has must for all, may and can for 
some, mustn’t and can’t for no, but it has developed needn’t for nall (van der Auwera 
1998, van der Auwera & Bultinck 2001). In fact, not just any, we claim, is of this type, 
and so is not any old. 
 That the troublesome fourth Aristotelian concept does make sense has not meant that 
Neo-Aristotelians have gone back to the Aristotelian square. What they have done 
(Horn 1990, van der Auwera 1996) is to frame this notion in terms of a disjunction of 
the two non-universal concepts: not all means ‘either no or some’ and needn’t means 
‘either mustn’t/can’t’ or may/can’. This is what we need here too. (24a), for instance, 
means that the speaker only goes to bed with specific individuals, allowing, however, 
that nobody meets the speaker’s criteria and that (s)he does not therefore go to bed with 
anyone. Figure 8 places this intermediate meaning-in-context, exactly like in the 
quantification only maps in van der Auwera (1996, 1998) and van der Auwera & 
Bultinck (2001).7 
 
 
Zero quantification - No choice 
 
 
 
Existential or zero 
quantification  
Specific or no choice 
 
 
Existential quantification 
Specific choice 
 
Existential quantification  
Non-specific choice 
 
 
Universal quantification - No choice 
 
 
The fact that the not just any meaning-in-context finds a natural place on the Neo-
Aristotelian map and not on the Haspelmath map is rather strong evidence in favor of 
the former. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper points to some strengths and weaknesses of the semantic map that 
Haspelmath (1997) offered for indefiniteness. The main weakness of the Haspelmath 
resides in the fact that it oversimplifies the relations between meanings, contexts and 
resulting meanings-in-context. As a representation of meanings-in-context, the paper 
argued that it is worthwhile linking up the Haspelmath map with proposals starting from 
the Aristotelian Square of Oppositions. Since these proposals take the Aristotelian 
thinking in new directions, they are called ‘Neo-Aristotelian’. The paper then explored 
one Neo-Aristotelian proposal, viz. one with a square with three layers. 
 
                                                 
7 The counterpart to ‘some if not no’ is ‘some if not all’, but we don’t put it on the new map, for there 
might not be a single language that lexicalizes or at least expresses ‘some if not all’ in any special way. 
14 Johan van der Auwera and Lauren Van Alsenoy 
 
References 
Croft, William & Poole, Keith T. (2008). “Inferring universals from grammatical variation: 
multidimensional scaling for typological analysis”. Theoretical Linguistics 34: 1-37. 
Fobbe, Eilika (2004). Die Indefinitpronomina des Deutschen. Aspekte ihrer Verwendung und ihrer 
historischen Entwicklung. Heidelberg: Winter. 
Giannakidou, Anastasia (1998). Polarity sensitivity as (non)veridical dependency. Amsterdam: 
Benjamins. 
Haspelmath, Martin (1997). Indefinite Pronouns. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Haspelmath, Martin (2003). “The geometry of grammatical meaning: Semantic maps and cross-linguistic 
comparison”. In: Tomasello, Michael (ed.), The new psychology of language: Cognitive and 
functional approaches to language structure, Volume 2. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 
211-242. 
Hoeksema, Jack (1983). “Negative polarity and the comparative”. Natural Language and Linguistic 
Theory 1: 403-434. 
Hoeksema, Jack (2010). “Negative and positive polarity items: an investigation of the interplay of lexical 
meanings and global conditions on expression”. In: Horn, Laurence R. (ed.), On the expresssion of 
negation. Berlin, Mouton de Gruyter, 187-224. 
Horn, Laurence R. (1990). “Hamburgers and Truth: Why Gricean explanation is Gricean”. In: Hall, Kira, 
Koenig, Jean-Pierre, Meacham, Michael, Reinman, Sondra & Sutton, Laurel A. (eds), Proceedings of 
the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society. Berkeley: Berkeley Linguistics 
Society, 454-471. 
Horn, Laurence R. (2000). “Pick a Theory (Not Just Any Theory): Indiscriminatives and the Free Choice 
Indefinite”. In: Horn, Laurence R. & Kato, Yusuhiko (eds), Negation and Polarity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 147-192. 
Kadmon, Nirit & Landman, Fred (1993). “Any”, Linguistics and Philosophy 16: 353-422. 
Ladusaw, William A. (1980). Polarity Sensitivity as Inherent Scope Relations. New York: Garland. 
Linguistic Discovery (2010). Theme issue on semantic maps. http://linguistic-
discovery.dartmouth.edu/cgi-bin/WebObjects/Journals.woa/xmlpage/1/issue 
Szabolsci, Anna (2004). “Positive polarity—Negative polarity”. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 
22: 409-452. 
Theoretical Linguistics (2008). Theme issue on Croft and Poole 2008. 
van der Auwera, Johan (1996). “Modality: the three-layered scalar square”. Journal of Semantics 13: 181-
195. 
van der Auwera, Johan (1998). “Sobre la lexicalización de los modales vs. cuantificadores y 
conjunciones”. Estudios de tipología lingüistica ed. by Juan de Dios Luque Durán & Antonio Pamies 
Bertrán. Granada: Método Ediciones, 179-193. 
van der Auwera, Johan & Bultinck, Bert (2001). “On the lexical typology of modals, quantifiers, and 
connectives”. Perspectives on semantics, pragmatics, and discourse. ed. by István Kenesei & Robert 
M. Harnish. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 173-186. 
van der Auwera, Johan, De Cuypere, Ludovic & Neuckermans, Annemie (2006). “Negative indefinites: A 
typological and diachronic perspective on a Brabantic construction”. In: Nevalainen, Terttu, Klemola, 
Juhani & Laitinen, Mikko (eds), Types of variation. Diachronic, dialectal and typological interfaces. 
Amsterdam, Benjamins, 305-319. 
van der Auwera, Johan, Kehayov, Petar & Vittrant, Alice (2009). “Modality’s semantic map revisited: 
acquisitive modals”. In: Hogeweg, Lotte / De Hoop, Helen / Malchukov, Andrej (eds), Cross-
linguistic Studies of Tense, Aspect, and Modality. Amsterdam, Benjamins, 271-302. 
van der Auwera, Johan & Van Alsenoy, Lauren (forthcoming). “Indefiniteness maps: problems, prospects 
and ‘retrospects’”. Atti del Convegno della Società Italiana di Glottologia (Palermo 2008). 
Vlachou, Evangelia (2007). Free choice in and out of context: Semantics and Distribution of French, 
Greek and English Free Choice Items. Doctoral dissertation Universities of Utrecht and Paris IV. 
 
